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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
) Is the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination violated by a court order directing a parent to
produce her previously abused son or reveal his whereabouts?
1

2) Does the assertion of a mother’s fifth amendment
privilege against seIf-incrimination prevail in the face of
society’s interest in protecting the child?

i
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Nos. 68-1182 and 88-6651
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM,

1989

BALTIMORE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Pet i tloner,
V.

JACQUELINE BOUKNIGHT,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is reported
at In re Maurice M. .

314 Md. 391, 550 A.2d 1135 (1988).
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This case was decided and Judgment was entered by the Court
of Appeals of Maryland on December 19,

1968.

The petition for

writ of certiorari was timely filed and was granted on April 3,
1989.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under section

1257(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code.

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
This case involves the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 23,

1987 the infant son of Jacqueline Bouknight,

Maurice, was admitted to the hospital with a broken leg and pre
existing fractures.
injuries,

(J.A.

13.)

Because of the nature of the

the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (the

"Department”) obtained authorization on February 11,
place the child under shelter care in a foster home.
10.)

In addition,

1987 to
(J.A. 6-

the Department filed a petition in the Circuit

Court for Baltimore City (Division of Juvenile Causes) to declare
Maurice a Child In Need of Assistance under Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.
Code Ann.

I 3-601(e)

(1984).

The petition recited a history of

the child’s injuries and detailed Ms. Bouknight’s emotional
problems and previous abusive conduct toward Maurice.
10.)

At a May 19,

(J.A. 8-

1987 hearing, Ms. Bouknight stipulated to the

facts alleged in the petition, and she agreed to continue her
child’s care in a foster home.
On July 17,

(J.A. 20-21.)

1987 Maurice was returned to Ms. Bouknight’s

care subject to the results of a psychological evaluation.
27.)
27,

(J.A.

Dr. Joseph M. Eisenberg conducted the evaluation on July
1967 and concluded that Ms. Bouknight was not "emotionally

capable of providing the adult protection, nurturance, and care
that would be required for the child’s safety and security."
(J.A.

25.)

Ms. Bouknight’s child was declared to be a Child In

2

Need of Assistance on August 18,

1967.

The parties agreed that

Ms. Bouknight would retain custody of the child provided that she
cooperate with the Department and refrain from physically
punishing him.

(J.A. 27-28.)

In early April of 1986 the Department sought the assistance
of the Baltimore Police Department, as they were unable to locate
Ms.

Bouknight’s child.

On April 15,

to the Homicide Division.
On April

16,

1986 the case was referred

(J.A. 88.)

1988 the Department acknowledged the

possibility of this being a murder case (J.A. 90) and filed a
petition alleging that Ms. Bouknight failed to comply with the
August 18,

1986 order.

(J.A. 33-35.)

Specifically,

the petition

claimed that by refusing to provide the current whereabouts of
Maurice, Ms. Bouknight had failed to cooperate with the
Department.

In addition,

the Department filed a Motion for

Contempt based upon Ms. Bouknight*s refusal to disclose the
whereabouts of her son when asked by a Department representative
on April 7,

1988.

On April 20,

(J.A. 36-39.)
1988 the Juvenile Master held Ms. Bouknight in

contempt for failing to produce her child in court.

(J.A. 55.)

The court also invoked the participation of a Homicide detective.
Detective James Jones (J.A. 52), who advised the Department that
Ms.

Bouknight's case should be regarded as a homicide case.

(J.A.

93.)

During the next week, both the Homicide and Youth

authorities continued to work with the Department on Ms.
Bouknight's case (J.A. 94), again characterizing her case as a

3

possible homicide.
April 27,

1966.

(J.A. 95.)

Ms. Bouknight was arrested on

At her hearing,

she provided inaccurate

information as to her son’s whereabouts.

(J.A. 65, 70.)

Detective Jones was present during these proceedings.
On April 26,

(J.A. 67.)

1988 the court continued to hold Ms. Bouknight

in civil contempt for failing to produce Maurice before the court
or to reveal

his exact whereabouts.

(J.A. 74.)

Bouknight was forced to remain in jail.

Accordingly, Ms.

Her counsel argued that

the opportunity to purge herself of contempt was not
constitutionally valid if it would involve the admission of a
crime.

(J.A.

72.)

Nevertheless, the court suggested that an

appropriate criminal

investigation be initiated.

(J.A. 75.)

The court conducted further hearings on the constitutional
issue of se1f*incrimination (J.A.

103-44), and the Homicide

Division continued its investigations by putting additional
detectives on the case.

(J.A. 98.)

On May 26,

1968 the Juvenile

Court refused to vacate its order on the grounds that Ms.
Bouknight could purge herself in ways that did not involve her
testimony.

(J.A.

157.)

The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to
a decision by the Court of Special Appeals and vacated the
Juvenile Court’s contempt order on December 19,
that

(1) requiring Ms.

1966.

It held

Bouknight to produce her child or provide

information regarding his whereabouts violated her fifth
amendment privilege against se1f-incrimination;

(2) Ms. Bouknight

did not waive her constitutional privilege by providing

4

inaccurate Information as to the child's whereabouts; and (3) the
public right to protect children did not outweigh Ms. Bouknight’s
individual

right against se 1 f - i ncr im i na t i on.

550 A.2d. at 1135.

In re Maurice Mj_.

The Department is seeking reversal of the

Maryland Court of Appeals’ decision.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Juvenile Court's contempt order, requiring Respondent
Bouknight to produce her infant son or to reveal his exact
whereabouts,

violates Respondent's fifth amendment privilege

against se1f-incrimination.

Furthermore,

no societal interest is

sufficient to overcome Ms. Bouknight’s core constitutional
pr1Vilege.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
protects an individual from being ’’compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself ....*'

U.S. Const, amend. V.

The spirit of this constitutional privilege requires that the
sovereign seeking to prosecute an individual must do so on the
strength of evidence gathered through its own independent labors,
rather than through the coerced assistance of the accused.
An effective judicial analysis of a fifth amendment claim
involves three crucial questions:

the court must determine

whether the elements of "compulsion," "testimony" and
"incrimination" have been sufficiently established.
108 S. Ct. 2341 (1988)

See Doe v._

United States.

487 U.S.

also Fisher v.

United States. 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).

5

(Doe II); see

If the court finds that a suspect has been compelled to make an
incriminating testimonial communication,

the conclusion is

inescapable that the suspect's fifth amendment privilege against
se1f-incrimination has been violated.
A civil

contempt order constitutes sufficient compulsion for

the purposes of the fifth amendment claim.
2346.

Doe 11. 108 S. Ct. at

In the present case, by requiring Ms. Bouknight to produce

the infant before the court or reveal his whereabouts in order to
purge herself of contempt,

the prosecution has compelled her to

produce evidence.
To be considered "testimonial," a suspect's communication
"must Itself,

explicitly or Implicitly, relate a factual

assertion or disclose information."

Doe 1 1.

108 S. Ct, at 2347,

Ms. Bouknight’s compliance with the court order would implicitly
assert the facts of

(1) her continuing control and dominion over

the infant and (2) the actual
addition,

location of the infant.

In

compelling an individual to "disclose the contents of

Cher] own mind," through words or actions, constitutes testimony
for the purpose of the fifth amendment.
354 U.S.

118,

128 (1957).

the child and his actual
Bouknight's knowledge,

Curcio v. United State_s,

Because the dominion and control of
location are facts peculiarly within Ms,

their compelled disclosure must be

entitled to fifth amendment protection.

The facts and

circumstances of the present case clearly indicate that Ms.
Bouknight's act of producing the demanded evidence constitutes a
testimonial

communication.

6

An Individual's testimonial communications will be
considered to have an incriminating effect in situations where
the witness has "reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a
direct answer."
(1951).

Hoffman v. United States. 341 U.S. 479, 486

The circumstances of the present case suggest that Ms.

Bouknight has a reasonable apprehension that she will be
prosecuted if production of the infant before the court or
disclosure of his whereabouts reveals that a crime has been
committed upon his person.

Because Ms. Bouknight is the focus of

the court’s suspicion, an implicit assertion of the facts of
dominion,

control and location would "furnish a link in the chain

of evidence needed to prosecute" Ms. Bouknight for child abuse or
possibly homicide.

1 d.

Based on the application of this Court’s recognized
analytical

framework,

it is evident that compliance with the

court order would subject Ms. Bouknight to incriminating
testimonial compulsion in violation of her fifth amendment
privilege against se1f-incrimination.
fundamental
governmental

Ms. Bouknight’s

constitutional right is not overcome by a
interest in protecting the welfare of her child.

The balancing of a constitutional right in order to
accommodate a state interest has never been invoked by this Court
in a contempt of court situation.

To the contrary, this Court

considered the balancing of an individual’s fifth amendment
privilege to be impermissible in New Jersey v. Portash. 440 U.S.
450,

459 (1979).

7

A balancing approach is inappropriate in the present case
for a number of reasons.

First, the doctrine of immunity

represents a reasonable alternative means to accommodate the
Department’s need for information.

In addition, the balancing

approach employed in the context of other constitutional
provisions does not justify the same treatment of the fifth
amendment.

Furthermore,

the only area in which this Court has

chosen to balance a core fifth amendment privilege is in the area
of regulatory self-reporting statutes.

The civil contempt order

under which Ms. Bouknight is being held differs significantly
from a mere statutory reporting requirement.
Even if this Court insists upon classifying this case as one
in which a balancing approach is appropriate,
Ms.

it is evident that

Bouknight’s individual privilege is not overcome by any

governmental

interest.

This Court set forth the balancing test

for fifth amendment claims in Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Board,

302 U.S. 70 C1965).

Albertson held that the fifth

amendment privilege is paramount to any government interest when
the individual

is confronted with substantial hazards of self

incrimination.

The risk of se1f-incrimination is substantial

when the disclosure requirement is directed toward a "group
inherently suspect of criminal activities" and when the area is
"permeated with criminal

statutes."

1d. at 79.

In applying the Albertson balancing test to Ms. Bouknight’s
case,

it is evident that she faces a substantial risk of self-

incrimination sufficient to defeat the state’s interest.

e

First,

the Juvenile Court is directing the contempt order against Ms.
Bouknight as a member of the "highly suspect group" of parents
who may be child abusers.

The second Albertson requirement also

is fulfilled because the crimes of child abuse and homicide are
both areas "permeated with criminal statutes."
In the self-reporting cases,
the substantial
activities,

this Court has refused to let

governmental concerns such as communist

gambling,

gun control and drug distribution outweigh

an individual's fifth amendment privilege.

On the other hand,

matters such as self-reporting of traffic accidents do not
present a substantial

risk of se1f-incrimination so as to violate

the fifth amendment.

Certainly,

the self-reporting of evidence

which could lead to murder or child abuse charges would fall
within the category in which this Court has sustained the
individual’s privilege against se 1 f-incrimination.
Ms.

Therefore,

Bouknight’s fifth amendment privilege is not overcome by any

governmental

interest.

Child abuse is a serious societal problem today.
murder,

rape,

drug distribution and organized crime.

But so is
However, no

public interest has been held to outweigh the fifth amendment
protection of persons accused of those crimes.

Allowing an

exception for the protection of children would initiate the
erosion of all

fifth amendment protections since all victims of

heinous crimes would demand the same exception.

This Court

cannot allow the identity of the victim to diminish the
defendant's constitutional rights. ' If this Court were to allow

9

the exception sought by Petitioner,

the "subtle encroachment"

concerns expressed by this Court would be realized; the fifth
amendment privilege against se1f-incrimination would then be
subject to substantial deterioration.
ARGUMENT
I,

MS. BOUKNIGHT’S COMPELLED COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT ORDER TO
PRODUCE HER CHILD OR REVEAL HIS WHEREABOUTS VIOLATES HER
FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-I NCR IMI NAT I ON BECAUSE
IT WOULD INVOLVE AN INCRIMINATING TESTIMONIAL COMMUNICATION.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution

protects an individual

from being "compelled in any criminal case

to be a witness against himself •

.

.

U.S. Const, amend. V.

This privilege against se1f-incrimination is not limited to
criminal cases,
criminal,

but can be asserted "in any proceeding, civil or

administrative or judicial,

adjudicatory." Kastiear v.

investigatory or

United States. 406 U.S. 441, 444

(1972) .
The Se1f- 1ncrimination Clause was intended to prevent the
use of

legal compulsion to extract from a suspect evidence

necessary to accuse or convict her.

This Court has described the

process of compelling a person to convict herself of a crime as
being "contrary to the principals of free government" and
"abhorrent to the instincts of an American."
States.

116 U.S. 616, 632 (1885).

Boyd v. United

Courts and scholars agree that

the spirit of the fifth amendment privilege against self
incrimination requires the prosecution to "shoulder the entire
load."

Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott. 382 U.S. 406, 415

10

(1966);

see a 1 so 8 J. Wlgmore, Evidence 317 (McNaughten rev.

1961).

The sovereign seeking to prosecute an individual is

required to do so on the strength of evidence gathered through
its own independent labors,
the accused.
genera 1 1 y E.

Miranda v.

rather than the coerced assistance of

Arizona, 384 U.S, 436, 460 (1966); see

Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today (1955).

An effective judicial analysis of a fifth amendment claim
involves three basic questions.

First,

the Court must determine

whether the suspect has been compelled to produce evidence.
Second,

the Court must discern whether the act of producing the

evidence is a testimonial communication.

Finally, the Court must

consider the incriminating effect of the suspect’s production of
evidence.
U.S.

See Doe 1 1 ,

at 410.

108 S. Ct. at 2346; see also Fisher, 425

If the Court concludes that Ms. Bouknight has been

compelled to make an incriminating testimonial communication, the
conclusion is inescapable that her fifth amendment privilege
against se1f^incrimination has been violated.
A.

Ms. Bouknight’s compelled production of evidence
constitutes testimonial communication because it
requires her to make implicit assertions of facts and
to disclose the contents of her mind.

In analyzing the fifth amendment privilege against self
incrimination,

the Court must first determine whether Ms.

Bouknight is being compelled to produce evidence.

This Court has

stated that "the Fifth Amendment protects the person asserting
the privilege only from comoe11ed seIf-incrimination. "
States

V.

Doe.

465 U.S. 605, 610 (1.984)

11

United

(Doe 1) (emphasis in

original).

A civil contempt order constitutes sufficient

compulsion for the purpose of a fifth amendment claim.
108 S.

Ct. at 2346.

Doe 1 1,

Because Ms. Bouknight’s refusal to comply

with the court order has resulted in her confinement for civil
contempt,

she is subject to sufficient compulsion.

The second inquiry that must be made in analyzing Ms.
Bouknight’s fifth amendment claim is whether her act of producing
evidence constitutes testimonial communication.

This Court has

recognized that the fifth amendment privilege applies to protect
an accused from providing the state with incriminating evidence
of a testimonia 1 or communicative nature.
States.
U.S.

425 U.S.

757,

761

391,

Fisher v. United

408 (1976); Schmerber v. California, 384

(1966).

To be considered "testimonial," a suspect’s communication
"must itself,

explicitly or implicitly,

assertion or disclose information."
The fifth amendment privilege,
imply assertions of facts.

relate a factual

Doe 1 1.

100 S. Ct. at 2347.

therefore, applies to acts that

In addition, compelling a person to

"disclose the contents of Cher] own mind," through words or
actions,

constitutes testimony for the purpose of the fifth

amendment.

Curcio,

35A U.S. at 128.

testimonial

standard applies to both the verbal and physical

communications of Ms.

Furthermore, the

Bouknight because the fifth amendment

privilege "reaches an accused's communications, whatever form
they might take ,

,

.

Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 763-64.
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A determination of whether Ms. Bouknight’s compliance with
^he court order would have testimonial significance necessarily
(jepends on the particular facts and circumstances of the present
^ase.

Fisher.

425 U.S. at 410.

To purge herself of contempt and

^hereby free herself from imprisonment, Ms. Bouknight must either
produce her son before the court or reveal his whereabouts.

By

psquiring her to verbally disclose the infant’s whereabouts, the
government is compelling her to "disclose the contents of her own
njind."

The actual

location of the infant is clearly knowledge

contained within Ms.

Bouknight’s own mind.

Likewise, the

duration and extent of Ms. Bouknight’s control over the infant
are facts peculiarly within her knowledge.

Even if she were to

disclose the child’s whereabouts through nonverbal means, her
physical acts would inevitably require her to impart information
contained within her mind.

Indeed,

this type of nonverbal

communication constitutes "testimony" because the fifth amendment
privilege protects an Ms. Bouknight’s communications "whatever
form they might take."

Schmerber. 304 U.S. 763-64.

Furthermore,

compliance with the court order requiring the production of the
child would implicitly assert (1) her continuing dominion and
control over the infant and (2) the actual

location of the child.

Based on the facts and circumstances of the present case, Ms.
Bouknight’s compelled communications would have testimonial
significance because they would make implicit assertions of fact
and disclose the contents of her mind.

13

If an individual's communication explicitly or implicitly
asserts "possession or controlt" this Court will consider It to
pe testimonial
Fisher.

for the purpose of a fifth amendment claim.*

425 U.S.

at 410.

In Fisher,

documents of a taxpayer in

the hands of his attorney were subpoenaed pursuant to an Internal
lievenue Service tax investigation.
fifth amendment claim,

In analyzing the taxpayer's

this Court held that "[t]he act of

producing [documents! has communicative aspects of its own,
wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced."
410.

Id. at

In defining the "communicative aspects" of production, this

Court stated that compliance with the subpoena would tacitly
concede the taxpayer's possession or control of the documents.
I d.

The Court further reasoned that because this averment added

little or nothing to the prosecution's case,

the "communicative

aspects" of production were "foregone conclusions" under the
circumstances; therefore,

the act of production was not entitled

to fifth amendment protection.

Id. at 411.

However, the Court's

analysis in Fisher clearly indicates that a communication will be
considered testimonial

if it requires an individual to explicitly

or implicitly assert facts such as location, possession and
contro1.
The facts the government seeks to elicit from Ms. Bouknight
cannot be considered "foregone conclusions" as they were in

* If an individual’s communications assert either
"existence" or "authentication" they will also be considered
testimonial.
Fisher. 425 U.S. at 410.
14

Fisher.

On the contrary,

the government presently has no

information regarding the facts of dominion, control and location
of the child.

Ms. Bouknight contends that the infant has been

residing with her sister in Texas.

(J.A. 65-66.)

Although the

government has refuted this contention, the prosecution remains
uncertain as to the whereabouts of the infant.

In addition, the

government has not been able to provide any evidence of its own
to establish the element of dominion and control.
Fisher.

Unlike in

where the facts of dominion, control and location added

little or nothing to the prosecution’s case,

these facts would

constitute the very foundation of the prosecution’s investigation
of Ms.

Bouknight.

Indeed,

since the facts of dominion, control

and location are essential to any criminal prosecution of Ms.
Bouknight,

the

lack of current criminal charges against her

indicates that these facts are not "foregone conclusions."
The decisions of other courts lend support to this Court’s
proposition that implicit assertions of facts constitute
testimonial communication within the scope of the fifth
amendment.
1239 (1980),

In Cnmmonwea1th v. Hushes. 300 Mass. 583, 404 N.E.2d
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held

that a court order compelling an individual to produce a revolver
suspected of being used in the commission of a crime violated the
Se 1 f - I ncrimination Clause.

Although the court recognized that

the suspect could produce the weapon without uttering a sound,
held that ”[i]f the defendant should produce the revolver, he
would be making implicitly a statement about its existence.
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it

location and control
States

.

.

.

Id. at 592.

Likewise,

in United

Catnpos-Serrano. 430 F.2d 173 C7th Cir. 1970), the

V.

Circuit Court considered an individual's fifth amendment claim
involving the production of an alien registration card.

The

defendant was accused of knowing possession of a forged alien
registration card.

The court held that compelling the defendant

to produce the card violated his fifth amendment privilege
against se1f-incrimination because the act of production
implicitly admitted the card's existence,
defendant's control over it.

location, and the

The court proceeded to emphasize

that "Cain individual should not be compelled to produce the
crime itself."

1 d. at 176.

These two cases exemplify the

appropriate application of this Court’s proposition that the
fifth amendment privilege "applies to acts that imply assertions
of fact."

Doe

11.

108 S. Ct. at 2347.

This Court’s determination that certain acts are not
sufficiently testimonial for purposes of applying the fifth
amendment must be distinguished from the facts of the present
case.

The fifth amendment privilege protects an individual’s

communications and testimony,

"but that compulsion which makes a

suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence* does
not violate [the privilege]."
Therefore,
sample;*

*

Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 764.

a suspect may be compelled to furnish a blood

to provide a handwriting exemplar;’

Schmerber.

384 U.S. 757,
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to stand in a

lineup;*

or wear particular clothing.*

The fifth amendment

privilege was not implicated in each of those cases because the
suspects were not required to "disclose any knowledge [they might
possess];" they were not required "to speak Ctheir] guilt."
United States v.

Wade.

388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967).

In the present case,

however, Ms. Bouknight is being

compelled to disclose knowledge she has regarding the whereabouts
of her son.

She is not subject to compulsion which makes her the

source of "real or physical evidence.**

Because she is being

required to "speak her guilt," the facts of the present case are
distinguishable from Schmerber and its progeny.
The government has failed to establish these facts through
its own independent labors.

In effect,

the government is seeking

to be relieved of its ignorance by compelling the information
from Ms.

Bouknight.

To require Ms. Bouknight to comply with the

court order by producing the child or revealing his whereabouts
would relieve the prosecution of its constitutional duty to
"shoulder the entire load."

Tehan, 382 U.S. at 415.

Because Ms.

Bouknight’s compliance with the court order would compel her to
disclose the contents of her mind and to make implicit assertions
of facts,

her compelled communications would have sufficient

testimonial

significance for fifth amendment purposes.

Gi1 be r t

V.

California. 388 U. S. 263 (1967).

Uni ted States
Holt V.

V.

Wade. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

United States. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
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B.

Ms, Bouknight*s compliance with the court order would
have an incriminating effect in that it would "furnish
a link in the chain of evidence" needed to prosecute
her.

The final factor that the Court must consider in an analysis
of an individual's fifth amendment claim is the incriminating
effect of the suspect's production of evidence.

This Court has

defined "incrimination" as a statement which leads directly to
evidence implicating the accused.
U.S.

471. 487 (1963),

however,

Wone Sun v. United States, 371

The protection of the fifth amendment,

extends beyond answers that would lead directly to

implicating evidence.

The privilege also embraces answers that

would "furnish a link in the chain of evidence" needed to
prosecute the suspected offender,

Hoff man, 341 U.S. at 486, As

the fifth amendment privilege "reaches an accused's
communications, whatever form they might take," Schmerber, 384
U.S, at 763-64,

the Hoffman "link in the chain of evidence"

standard applies to both verbal and physical communications.
In the present case, Ms, Bouknight's compelled testimonial
communications and implied assertions of fact would provide the
prosecution with a significant "link in the chain of evidence"
needed to prosecute her.
the court’s suspicion,

Because Ms. Bouknight is the focus of

if her testimonial communications reveal

that a crime has been committed upon the child’s person, she will
be the primary suspect in a subsequent criminal
Ms.

investigation.

Bouknight’s control over the child and his actual

location

are both crucial "links" in the evidence needed by the government
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to prosecute her for child abuse or possibly homicide.

The

compelled testimonial communications could possibly constitute
disclosure of the substance or foundation of a crime.
amendment privilege,

The fifth

in addition to requiring the prosecution to

"shoulder the entire load," has always protected individuals
against this type of testimony.
The Se1f"1ncrimination Clause applies to situations in which
the witness has "reasonable cause to apprehend danger" from
disclosure of compelled information.
The relevant inquiry,

therefore,

Hof fman. 341 U.S. at 486.

is whether the accused could

have reasonably sensed the peril of prosecution.

Id. at 468.

Furthermore, a party who wishes to claim the fifth amendment
privilege must be "confronted by substantial and ’real*, and not
merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination."
Marchetti v.

United States. 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968).

Turning to the facts of the present case,' it is evident that
Ms.

Bouknight not only has a "reasonable cause to apprehend

danger" from compliance with the court order, but that her
apprehension is "substantial and real."

The introduction of Dr.

Eisenberg’s testimony during the Juvenile Court proceedings
revealed his professional opinion that there was a substantial
likelihood of child abuse in this case.
addition,

(J.A. 22-26.)

In

the court repeatedly expressed its concern that a crime

had been committed upon the infant's person.

Specifically,

court stated "there was concern that the baby was dead.
frankly,

that concerns the daylights out of this court."
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the

Quite
(J.A.

51.)

Moreover,

the feet that Ms. Bouknlght provided false

information to the court indicates that she apprehended danger
from a truthful response.

The presence of a homicide detective

throughout the proceedings serves as further evidence of the
’’substantial and real" danger of subsequent criminal prosecution.
Based on these facts,

it is obvious that Ms. Bouknight reasonably

sensed the peril of prosecution for child abuse or possibly
homicide, and that her apprehension was "substantial and real."
The conclusion that Ms. Bouknight’s compelled testimony would
have an incriminating effect is,
C.

therefore,

inescapable.

Ms. Bouknight’s course of conduct constitutes
insufficient evidence for this court to infer a waiver
of her fifth amendment privilege.

Petitioner attempts to argue that Ms. Bouknight’s course of
conduct constitutes an implied waived her fifth amendment
privilege. However, a waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently to be valid.

Miranda. 364 U.S. at 444.

Vague

and uncertain evidence will not support a finding of waiver.
Smith V. United States. 337 U.S.

137,

150 (1949).

In addition,

it is impermissible to infer waiver from a silent record.
y.

Wineo. 407 U.S. 514, 525-26 (1972).

Barker

Furthermore, courts must

"indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional
U.S.

190,

rights."

Emsoak v. United States. 349

196 (1955).

Petitioner first argues that Ms. Bouknight’s course of
conduct in assuming custody of her child and agreeing to
"cooperate” with the Department constitutes an implied waiver of
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her fifth amendment privilege.
However,

(Petitioner's Brief at 28).

the record is silent as to whether this "cooperation"

required the compelled production of the child or disclosure of
his whereabouts.

Furthermore,

the evidence of any such

understanding of the term "cooperate" is vague and uncertain at
best.

Because of the lack of substantial evidence supporting an

inference of waiver, Petitioner has failed to overcome this
Court's requisite presumption against waiver.
Petitioner also argues that Ms. Bouknight has waived her
fifth amendment privilege by providing false information
regarding the child’s whereabouts.

(Petitioner’s Brief at 29).

Testimonial waiver can be effectuated only if Ms. Bouknight’s
statements would have resulted in further incrimination and she
had reason to know that those statements would be interpreted as
a waiver.
States V.

Rogers v.
Singer.

United States. 340 U.S. 367 (1951); Uni ted_

785 F.2d 228 (Sth Cir.

667 F.2d 274 (2d Cir.

1981).

1986); Klein v. Harris,

First, Ms. Bouknight’s statements

did not result in further incrimination.

To the contrary, Ms.

Bouknight attempted to exculpate herself by providing false
information regarding the child’s location.

Second, because Ms.

Bouknight presumably was unaware of the existence of her fifth
amendment privilege,*

she had no reason to know that her

statements would constitute a waiver of that right.

* It does not appear from the record that Ms. Bouknight was
informed by counsel or by the court of her right to remain
si lent.
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THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-I NCR IMI NAT I ON IS
NOT OVERCOME BY ANY GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
A.

Balancing of government interests against Ms,
Bouknight'B constitutional right is impermissible.

In a contempt of court situation, this Court has never
sanctioned a balancing of government interests against the fifth
amendment privilege against se1f- 1ncrimination.

In fact, such

balancing was prohibited in New Jersey v. Portash., ^40 U.S. 450
(1979), which held that a person's immunized grand jury testimony
c?ould not constitutionally be used to impeach him when he was a
defendant in a later criminal trial.

"[W3e deal with the

cjons t i tut iona I privilege against compulsory se 1 f - i ncr i minat ion in
its most pristine form.
unnecessary.
Likewise,

Balancing,

It is impermissible."

therefore,

is not simply:

Id. at 459 (emphasis added).

in Ms. Bouknight’s situation, balancing is not only

unnecessary,

it is impermissible.

Balancing cannot be tolerated in this case because the
state's legitimate need for information has already been
accommodated through the doctrine of immunity.

Immunity is

required if there is to be "rational accommodation between the
imperatives of the privilege and legitimate demands of government
to compel citizens to testify."
(emphasis added).

Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446

Furthermore,

the accommodation between the interest of the State and
the Fifth Amendment requires that the State have means
at its disposal to secure testimony if immunity is
supplied and testimony is still refused.
This is
recognized by the power of the court to compel
testimony, after a grant of immunity, bv usy of civil
contempt and coerced imprisonment.
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I^efkowltz

V.

Turley. 414 U.S. 70, 84 (1973)

(amphasis added);

^ee also Lefkowitz v. Cunningham. 431 U.S. 801, 809 (1977)
(**[0)006 proper immunity is granted,

the State may use its

contempt powers to compel testimony .

.

. **).

Because the

immunity option maintains a fair equilibrium between the
competing government and Individual

interests,

there is no reason

for the Court to further accommodate the state’s interest by now
employing a balancing test.
It may appear that the Department does not have any means
available to unearth the crucial
whereabouts.

information of the child’s

Because the Juvenile Court can easily offer Ms.

Bouknight immunity in exchange for the necessary information,
this "necessity for information" argument of the Department is an
illusion.

Because it has refused to exercise this reasonable

means of obtaining information, the Juvenile Court is powerless
under Tur1ev and Cunningham to charge her with contempt for
failure to testify.
The balancing of state interests against the fifth amendment
is not justified by Petitioner’s reliance upon instances in which
balancing has been used against other constitutional rights.
(Petitioner’s Brief at 23-24).
amendments,

Unlike the first and fourteenth

the fifth amendment exists to protect against

society’s highest penalty of criminal prosecution.

Because the

fifth amendment protects an individual’s very liberty,

it must be

afforded the greatest protection against competing state
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interests end should not casually be subjected to a balancing
test.'
Within the realm of the fifth amendment, there are only a
few areas in which this Court has used a balancing test to
encroach upon the privilege.
649

(1984),

In New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.

this Court created a "public safety" exception to the

requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s
answers may be admitted into evidence.

Under Quar1es, an officer

may circumvent Miranda requirements and demand information (such
as the

location of a hidden gun) from an arrested suspect if

there is an immediate danger to the public safety and welfare.
This "public safety" reasoning is inapposite to Ms.
Bouknight’s case.

First, a literal extension of Duar1es to this

case loads to an absurd result.

Maurice’s person (the analog to

the gun) poses no immediate danger to the public safety? only if
the infant were endangering the immediate public safety (perhaps
carrying a contagious disease) would this case fall within the
stricture of Quar 1 es.
judicial creation.
creation,

In addition, Miranda requirements are a

Because the fifth amendment is not a judicial

exceptions to this core constitutional protection

cannot be devised with the same ease,

if they are to be devised

’ Justices Black, Douglas and Chief Justice Warren
emphasized the impropriety of balancing as applied to
constitutional rights:
"CNJo constitutional right is safe from
being ’balanced* out of existence whenever a majority of this
Court thinks that the interests of the State ’weigh more’ than
the particular constitutional guarantee involved." Cohen v.
Hur1ev. 366 U.S. 117, 133 (1961) (Black J., dissenting).
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at all.

Most importantly,

the Quar1es opinion itself

acknowledges the limits of its own holding by "recognizing a
narrow exception to the Miranda rule in this case .
at 656 (emphasis added).

.

.

lis.

Because the Quar1es "public safety"

exception was intended to be a narrow one,

it cannot be extended

to this case.
Only in the area of self-reporting statutes, which require
the disclosure of potentially incriminating information, has this
Court ever invoked a balancing test against the core fifth
amendment privilege.
Board.

Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control

382 U.S. 70 (1965).

A civil contempt order, however,

not a self-reporting statute.

Rather,

is

it is the judicial means

used to compel cooperation within the trial process.

This method

of compulsion is quite distinct from a legislative enactment
which reflects the government’s regulatory need for information.
A balancing approach would require this Court to incorrectly
classify Ms. Bouknight’s contempt charge as a penalty for her
failure to report information that may tend to incriminate her
for child abuse or homicide.
self-reporting statute,

Because a contempt order is not a

the Albertson balancing test does not

even apply to this case.
B.

Ms. Bouknlght’s fifth amendment privilege against self
incrimination is not overcome when balanced afiainst the
public need of knowing the whereabouts of the child.

Notwithstanding the foregoing arguments,

if this Court finds

this to be a situation in which balancing must occur,

then Ms.

Bouknight’s privilege is not overcome by the Department’s
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r

Interest In knowing the whereabouts of Maurice.

This Court

recognized that "claims of overriding [state] interests are not
unusual

in Fifth Amendment litigation and they have not fared

veil."

Tur1ey. A14 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added); see also

Cunningham.

431 U.S. at 608 ("Cw3e have already rejected the

notion that citizens may be forced to incriminate themselves
because it serves a governmental need").*
In A1bertson.

this Court did not allow a state interest to

prevail over the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination.

In holding a statute that required individuals to

report their association with the Communist party as violative of
the fifth amendment,

this Court set forth a balancing test to

weigh a government interest against an individual’s fifth
amendment claim.

A1bertson, 382 U.S. at 79.

Albertson held that

a self-reporting statute violates the fifth amendment privilege
if It presents a substantial risk of se 1 f-incrimination.
The risk of se I f - incr imlnat ion is substantial

if:

J_d^

(D the statute

is "directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of
criminal activities," and (2)

it applies In an "area permeated

with criminal statutes, where [a] response .
the •

.

.

. might involve

. admission of a crucial element of a crime."

JA:-

* Tur1ey and Cunningham held that, despite the legitimate
state interest in maintaining integrity in government contracts,
requiring government contractors to sign a waiver of immunity
against subsequent criminal prosecution violated the fifth
amendment right against se1f-incrimination.
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This court has consistently applied A1 hertson to hold self
reporting statutes in violation of the fifth amendment when they
present an individual with a substantial risk of self
incrimination.

For example, a statutory requirement of paying

taxes on wagering income was struck down by this Court because
such payments involved the disclosure of participation in illegal
gambling activities.

Grosso v. United States. 390 U.S. 62

(1968); Marchetti v. United States. 390 U.S, 39 (1960).
Furthermore,

statutes that required the disclosure of illegally

transporting firearms***and illegal drug activity’*

have likewise

crumbled under the constitutional scrutiny of Albertson.

In each

this Court held that a substantial risk of self

case,

incrimination existed because the statutes were directed toward a
"highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activity"
in an "area permeated with criminal statutes."

Because the

substantial risk of seIf-incrimination existed, each of those
statutes violated the fifth amendment privilege against self
incrimination.
In applying A1bertson to Ms. Bouknight's case,

this Court

cannot hold the fifth amendment privilege to be overcome by the
state’s interest in knowing the whereabouts of her child.
First,

the contempt order is directed toward a "group inherently

suspect of criminal activity,".

*
**

Counsel representing Maurice has

Havnes v. United States. 390 U.S, 05 (1968).
Leary v. United States. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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admitted that "virtually every CINA (Child In Need of Assistance]
case involves some allegation of abuse or neglect which is
potentially subject to criminal
550 A,2d at 1142.

indictment."

In re Maurice M_. .

Therefore, parents of Children In Need of

Assistance comprise a "group inherently suspect of criminal
activity."

With specific reference to Ms. Bouknight,

the record

amply supports the fact that the Juvenile Court is selectively
directing the contempt order toward her as an individual criminal
suspect.

The Juvenile Court itself admits to the prosecutorial

and criminal nature of the proceedings by suggesting to the
Department "that Cit] initiate an appropriate criminal
investigation in this matter." (J.A. 75.)

These recommendations

to the Department, combined with the persistent involvement of
the homicide detective and the admissions of Maurice’s counsel,
establish that the Juvenile Court considers Ms. Bouknight to be a
member of a "group inherently suspect of criminal activity."
The Department’s requested production of the child violates
the second prong of A1bertson because the areas of child abuse
and murder are "permeated with criminal statutes."
area that has
addition,

Murder is an

long been "permeated with criminal statutes."

In

the felony of child abuse carries a substantial

criminal penalty of up to 15 years imprisonment in a federal
penitentiary.
Essentially,

Md. Ann. Code art. 27,

i 35A(b)

(1987).

the Juvenile Court is holding Ms. Bouknight in

contempt for failure to report information that might involve the
admission of a crucial element of a crime.
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A1 bertson* 342 U.S.

at 79.

If disclosure of the child reveals that a crime has been

committed upon his person, Ms. Bouknight will have admitted to a
crucial element of that crime.
This court upheld a self-reporting statute in only one case,
California v.

Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971).

A1ber tson test,

In applying the

this Court upheld a traffic reporting statute

because (1) the target group of drivers was not a "group
inherently suspect of criminal activities” and (2) the area of
traffic accidents was not "permeated with criminal statutes.”
1 d.

at 426.

Because the reporting of traffic accidents did not

involve a substantial risk of self-incrimination,

the state's

regulatory interest was allowed to outweigh the fifth amendment
priVilege.
Ms. Bouknight is being held in contempt under Md. Cts. 8c
Jud. Proc. Code Ann.

8 3-ei4(c)

(1984).

Although this statute

appears to be as broad-reaching as the statute involved in Byers,
the court must look to how the statute is being manipulated in
this case.

The Juvenile Court has used section 3-ei4(c) in a

selective manner to hold Ms. Bouknight in contempt for failure to
disclose potentially incriminating information.

The nature and

character of a contempt order should not change with respect to
the statute that authorizes it; a civil contempt order
constitutes compulsion under any circumstances.
Ct. at 2346.
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Doe__l_I_, 106 S.

It is important to note that Bvers was decided shortly
before Tur1ey. Cunningham and Portash.*

In Byers,

this Court

allowed an encroachment upon the constitutional right within the
self-reporting context.
Turley.

Notwithstanding Byers, this Court in

Cunningham and Portash refused to extend this

encroachment to the interrogation or trial processes.
Ms.

Because

Bouknight is being forced to answer official questions in the

presence of a homicide detective,

she is sufficiently within the

trial process to invoke the protection of Portash.
While Byers allowed the state regulatory interests to
override the fifth amendment,

the Court nevertheless emphasized

the tremendous delicacy involved in the balancing test:
Whenever the Court is confronted with the question of a
compelled disclosure that has an incriminating
potential, the judicial scrutiny is invariably a close
one.
Tension between the State’s demand for
disclosures and the protection of the right against
self-incrimination is likely to give rise to serious
Questions.
Inevitably these must be resolved in terms
of balancing the public need on the one hand, and the
individual claim to constitutional protections on the
other; neither interest can be treated lightly.
Bvers. 402 U.S. at 427 (emphasis added).

Ms. Bouknight may have

to incriminate herself for the serious crimes of child abuse or
murder, crimes which are far more severe than the mere traffic
violations implicated in Byers.

Because Ms. Bouknight’s

compliance with the contempt order has incriminating potential,
this Court must balance the competing interests with severe

* Byers was decided in 1971; Tur1ey in 1973; Cunningham in
1977; and Portash in 1979.
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Judicial scrutiny.

Allowing the state interest to prevail

in

this case would be to treat her fifth amendment privilege against
se1f“incrimination too lightly.
C.

This Court should not create exceptions that will
contribute to the destruction of our constitutional
privilege against se I f-incrim1nation.

”CThe] system [of criminal

Justice] is undermined when a

government deliberately seeks to avoid the burdens of independent
investigation by compelling se1f-incriminating disclosures."
Garner v. United States. 424 U.S. 648» 655-56 (1976).

The Court

cannot permit the government to avoid its requisite burden to
"shoulder the entire load" simply because it claims that the
necessary information cannot otherwise be obtained.

First, the

Department can get the necessary information through its own
independent investigations.

More conspicuously,

if the Juvenile

Court is concerned solely with the welfare of the child,

it may

offer Ms. Bouknight immunity in exchange for her testimony.

Its

refusal to do so demonstrates the prosecutorial interest of the
court.

Allowing the Juvenile Court to proceed in this manner is

simply intolerable within the spirit of constitutional

liberty

afforded by the fifth amendment right against se I f-incrimination.
Constitutional amendments "should receive a liberal
construction,

so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or

'gradual depreciation* of the rights secured by them, by
imperceptible practice of the courts .
States. 255 U.S. 298,
350 U.S. 422,

304 (1921).

427-28 (1956),

.

,

Gouled v. Un_i ted

In Ullmann v. United States,

this Court expressed its concerns
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regarding gradual encroachment upon the fifth amendment:

** 1 f it

be thought that the [fifth amendmentj privilege is outmoded in
the conditions of this modern agei

then the thing to do is to

take it out of the Constitution, not to whittle it down by the
subtle encroachments of judicial opinion."
The exception sought by Petitioner constitutes this feared
"subtle encroachment."
encroachment,

If this Court allowed such an

then it would be holding that an individual s

constitutional

right must be subordinated simply because the

potential victim is a child.

The constitutional treatment of

defendants cannot depend on who suffers from the alleged crime.
The only logical means of differentiating between defendants is
found in the context of

legislative judgment in creating

penalties relative to the gravity of the crime.
proceedings,

however,

In judicial

the state should have the same level of

concern in prosecuting all serious crimes.
As Petitioner emphasizes, child abuse is a serious problem
in today's society.

(Petitioner’s Brief at 21).

crimes of murder and rape are equally problematic,
so.

However,

the

if not more

If the Court creates a "children's rights" exception,

then

the victims of these other heinous crimes will demand to know why
they do not get the same exception, a demand which this Court
cannot ignore.

To allow an exception for children, but not for

all victims of egregious crimes, would be to make a judicial
value judgment.

The Court would then have to justify this value
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Judgment to those defendants who would receive less
constitutional protection as a result.
Because it is impossible for this Court to justify different
treatment of defendants based on who the victim is,

the Court

would begin to "whittle away" at the fifth amendment with each
new exception.
Gou1ed,

The concerns of this Court, as foretold in

U1Imann. and the Cohen dissent, will become reality.

The

fifth amendment right against se1f-incrimination will gradually
be eroded by judicial exceptions, beginning with the exception
urged here«
CONCLUSION
The purpose and spirit of the fifth amendment privilege
against se1f-incrimination requires the sovereign seeking to
prosecute an individual to do so on the strength of evidence
gathered through its own independent labors, rather than through
the coerced assistance of the accused.

Essentially, the fifth

amendment protects an individual from being compelled to provide
incriminating evidence through testimonial communications.

It is

the "extortion of information from the accused Cherself] that
offends our sense of justice."
322,

Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.

328 (1973).
The Juvenile Court has presented Ms. Bouknight with an

option to purge herself of contempt, which is constitutionally
infirmed.

By requiring Ms. Bouknight to produce her child before

the court or disclose his whereabouts, the Juvenile Court is
attempting to extort information from her.
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This compelled

production of evidence would certainly offend our sense of
justice.
Although balancing core constitutional protections against
state interests is a questionable endeavor, this Court must apply
close Judicial scrutiny if a balancing approach is to be
employed.

The government arguably has two distinct interests in

the present case:
Ms.

Bouknight.

governmental

protection of the infant and prosecution of

If this Court seeks to accommodate the

interest in protecting the child, the doctrine of

immunity is available to elicit full disclosure of the
information desired.

However,

the governmental interest in

prosecuting Ms. Bouknight cannot be accommodated under any
circumstances which would compel her to provide incriminating
testimony.

These two governmental

distinguished from each other.

interests must be

Otherwise,

the interests in

protecting the child would effectively allow the government to
prosecute Ms.

Bouknight based on her coerced assistance.

The protections guaranteed by the fifth amendment reflect
**many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations.”
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm*n of N.Y. Harbor. 378 U.S. 52* 55
(1964).

The Framers incorporated into our system of criminal

justice numerous protections for individuals suspected of
criminal activity.

Although these constitutional privileges are

sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," they often represent "a
protection to the innocent."

Id.
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Furthermore,

these

constitutional privilages protect an accused no matter how
deplorable the crime alleged.
To allow the government to disregard Ms. Bouknight's core
constitutional privilege against seIf-incrimination would be
detrimental
system.

to the fundamental values of our criminal justice

By creating a special exception to the fifth amendment,

this Court would be effectuating a subtle encroachment upon
individual

liberties.

Because it is impossible for this Court to

justify different treatment of defendants based on who the victim
is.

the Court would begin to whittle away at the protections

guaranteed by the fifth amendment.

The Maryland Court of Appeals

recognized that allowing the exception prayed for by Petitioners
would begin the intolerable process of judicial erosion of the
fifth amendment privilege against se1f-incrimination.

The well-

founded decision of that court to deny Petitioner's claim should
not be disturbed.

Dated:

November 16,

1969.

Respectfully submitted,

35

